, & I observe that you wrote that you 'did not always get on very well with the subject of the notice' (to which I paid little attention at the time), but the letter has made me wonder whether the phrase covered a reluctance on your part to write the life in view of the controversy which (as I understand) you had with Karl Pearson during his lifetime; & I therefore write to say that, if there is any such feeling on your part, I hope you will not consider yourself bound to undertake what may be to you an irksome duty. But my idea may be mistaken; if so, please forgive my intrusion.
Yours sincerely,
L.G. Wickham Legg
Any hope Wickham Legg might have entertained that Fisher would withdraw was dispelled by his immediate reply (30 June): 'Thanks for your considerate note. I only expressed myself as I did so that you should know that relations had not always been very cordial, but, after all, Pearson attacked Yule's work at one time much more violently than ever he did mine, and Yule's obituary for the Royal Society is as kind as possible'. Wickham Legg replied (2 July) 'If Yule turned the other cheek, I am sure you will roar like any sucking dove!' I have further been through your draft and put in a few minor corrections, aimed at clarification or at avoiding such infelicities as sometimes arise from phrases passing through more than one hand.
The great series on Contributions to the Theory of Evolution has, as I said, 26 separate members, although only 12 of these appeared in the Philosophical Transactions. Others appeared in the Proceedings and elsewhere, some being numbered and some not. I have during the last 35 years at various times had occasion to look at probably all of these and at the immense output which was published in Biometrika. Pearson must have written a considerable fraction of the whole contents of this journal. I have probably left the impression that as technical contributions to the advancement of statistical methods, the avowed aim in most cases, all this now cuts rather little ice, and, without being dogmatic, I doubt if anyone who has given so much time and attention to it as I have could form any other conclusion. The admiration felt for him as a 'giant of the Victorian age' must surely be due to the earlier writings on the philosophy of science, his attempt to develop a consistently rational materialism, to which I had given a good deal of space. I think it would be generally agreed that by far his most important positive contribution to statistical method, the subject on which he wrote most, does lie in the y2 goodness of fit test, and that he was singularly unreceptive to and often antagonistic to contemporary advances made by others in this field. The fact that he really achieved, in the eyes of his own circle, his latent ambition of High-priesthood did make his antagonism often effective and deleterious. But for this the work of Edgeworth and of Student, to name only two, would have borne fruit earlier.
I have certainly written without animus. Pearson once offered me the post of his chief assistant, which I was lucky in not accepting, as I could never have taken his work at his own valuation, but he certainly never did me any injury. A kind of plan of Pearson's aims as a young man is found in his address on The Ethic o f Freethoughtdelivered in 1883, and published with other material under the same title in 1888. Religion is defined as 'the relation of the finite to the infinite', with the inferences that 'the freethinker, in my sense of the term, possesses more real religion, more of the relation of the finite to the infinite than any mere believer in myth; his very knowledge makes him in the highest sense of the word a religious man'. The scientific worker 'may truly be termed a highpriest of freethought'. 'From this pursuit of religious truth ought to arise the enthusiasm of freethought'.
The nature of 'that truth . . . which it is the principal duty of freethought to seek after' consists in the laws of material causation conceived on strictly determinist principles. How narrowly cramped and unreceptive was this phase of nineteenth century materialism appears from the assertion, which has not been borne out by the discoveries of the last 50 years, that 'the only possible way in which you can think things is precisely identical with the actual way in which they do occur.' A better known work, which in the course of time passed into three editions, was the Grammar o f Science (1892), a book which, with rather extensive digressions, expounds the philosophical background, as Pearson conceived it, of the scientific method. The central doctrine is that 'Science is the description in conceptual shorthand (never the explanation) of the routine of our perceptual experience'. Clearly here a good deal depends on the meaning attached to the word 'explanation' which is evidently intended to mean much more than merely making plain or simple. Although Pearson is quite explicit in denying that what is known as Scientific Law imposes an iron necessity upon causation, he is equally clear in rejecting, what would seem the natural alternative, the popular concept of voluntary choice as a real cause.
Judged by these early writings Pearson might have devoted his later years to any branch of applied mathematics, or even to popularizing the philosophy of science in general, but his career was turned into other channels by the friendship and material support of Francis Galton [q.v.] whose 'Life and Letters' he published (1915, 1924 and 1930) . Years before, in his Hereditary Genius, (1869) Galton had shown how vague and apparently intangible ideas could be made quantitative and precise by the collection and adequate presentation of statistical data. In a crude way he had attempted a collaboration in experimental research with his cousin Charles Darwin. He had tried his hand at the statistical expression of meteorological phenomena, always with a feeling for the power of the method to give unity and order to a mass of incoherent facts, and now, with wisdom and experience, but without adequate mathematical technique, he was strongly convinced that quantita tive, and particularly statistical, methods were needed to consolidate Darwin's ideas, and give confidence to their practical application. With W.F.R. Weldon's [q. v.] wide biological interests, and Pearson's ambitious energy, Gabon believed a solid foun dation could be built for a timely advance in the method and theory of biological research.
In Pearson's work the immediate outcome was the appearance from 1894 onwards of a series of 26 extensive memoirs entitled Mathematical Contributions to the Theory o f Evolution. Of those numbered the first 12 appeared in the Philosophical T r a n s a c t i o n s : eight unnumbered are in the Proceedings of the Royal Soci biologist the title chosen might well appear surprising, for Pearson was here exploring his own general concepts in mathematical statistics, skew frequency curves, contingency, and the correlation coefficient, and producing mathematical tables to facilitate their use. Mendel's laws are discussed in the twelfth memoir, but only to be dismissed as inadequate.
A more enduring consequence was the foundation in 1901 of Biometrika: A Journal fo r the Statistical Study o f Biological Problems. For many years this beautifully produced quarterly was undoubtedly the focus of the development of mathematical statistics in this country. It attracted papers from outside Pearson's laboratory, and included some of the most important advances of a period of rapid progress. In building up the high reputation of this journal, Pearson's labours as editor were constant and indefatigable. It constituted the greater part of the scientific activity of his later life.
To Gabon's influence must also be ascribed Pearson's series of statistical en quiries, aimed at giving factual demonstration of the important truths that inheritance acts with equal force on man as on other animals, and on mental equally with bodily characteristics. If the data and methods may be criticized, the main conclusions of Pearson's work can now scarcely be questioned. Another contribution to the study of inheritance in Man, the fine pedigree collections published as the Treasury o f Human Inheritance (1909-) have made accessible the immense labours of such men as Nettleship and Usher, and provided invaluable material for the study of rare anomalies. (1910-) . In the introduction which he wrote for Biometrika he announced 'we expect to receive stalwart blows as well as to give them'. His controversial methods were overbearing and relentless, and accusations of ignorance and even of bad faith flowed too freely from his pen' In his long attack on Mendelism he encountered in William Bateson [q.v.] an opponent equally obstinate, and undoubtedly his master in sarcasm. The controversy proved nothing, but that Bateson did not know enough of mathematics, nor Pearson enough of biology. The great field of statistical investigation opened out by Mendel's theory was unrecognized by both. The bitterness of Karl Pearson's statistical criticisms undoubtedly left for many years a legacy of prejudice which has retarded real progress in the subject he had at heart.
Pearson s zest for polemics was unlimited. One of his series of publications was actually entitled Questions o f the Day and o f the Fray
To statistical methods still in use Pearson's most important contribution lies in the test of Goodness of Fit'. In a paper contributed to the Philosophical Magazine in 1900, Pearson considered the problem of the simultaneous departure from expectation of a number of normally distributed, but not necessarily independent variates. In % he found an admirably direct measure of joint departure from expectation. In the practical application of the method Pearson went astray, and the test was used erroneously for several years, but the test is so useful in all problems involving definite expectations of frequency that its initiation must be reckoned a major contribution to the subject.
As a mathematician, Pearson can scarcely be classed with the founders of the theory of errors, Laplace and Gauss, nor as a logician with Thomas Bayes, G. Boole [q.v.] or John Venn [q.v.] . He could, indeed, have made far more use of these great predecessors. That Pearson did so much is due rather to his unbounded energy and to his determination to set before himself and his contemporaries a task of a magnitude and difficulty worthy of his powers.
Pearson was elected F.R.S. in 1896 and was awarded the Darwin medal in 1898. He was an honorary fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and of University College, London; he also received the honorary degree of LL.D. from St. Andrew's University and of D.Sc. from the University of London. I do think that you have carried the process of transforming my original obituary rather far in this latest edition. After all, I suppose you want a considered judgement so far as one can be obtained, tolerably free from ephemeral delusions, and which, in fifty years time, may show that contemporary judgement was not altogether superficial. The idea given in your last paragraph of Pearson as the 'onlie begetter' of modern statistics is, I am sure, a fallacy, which is not really strengthened by the fact that it was eagerly embraced and fostered by Pearson himself. Galton gets far less credit than is his due, and I am sorry that you have cut out what I said about him. Your last paragraph seems to me not fair to Edgeworth and Sheppard, for example, who in their lives were overshadowed by Pearson, and to ignore their contributions in comparison with his. Nor, for that matter, is it fair to Gauss and Laplace, who provided the modern methods of regression analysis and characteristic function respectively, though Pearson seems to have had little knowledge of or use for them. Pearson was certainly a most energetic propagandist of his own points of view, but I do not think we ought to represent him as a towering genius.
Wickham Legg replied on 23 March with a lengthy defence of the draft, but a revision of the final paragraph, in which he attempted to meet Fisher half-way 'after consultation with colleagues who are learned in such matters'. He proposed:
Nevertheless Pearson, treading in the footsteps of Laplace and Gauss, did for biological studies on a great scale what F. Y. Edgeworth had already done tentatively in economics. He practically created a new discipline. When he began statistical work in 1893, there was no systematic instruction in statistical method in any university in England, nor were there any convenient text books or more advanced treatises, nor special journals. Fifty years later, instruction was being given at most universities, text-books & treatises were plentiful, and journals, other than that which he founded, were available. Even if his data and methods may nowadays be criticized, he remained the chief pioneer in this new discipline, which owes an immeasurable debt to his unbounded energy, and to the infectious enthusiasm inspired by his teaching. The work that Fisher did in connection with his draft notice, and in some cases the wording of the notice itself, influenced his own subsequent writing, especially with respect to the importance of Galton. In 1951 he used much of the draft notice in an article 'Statistics' written for a book Scientific Thought in the Twentieth Century, in a section headed 'Galton and Statistical Biology'. Recently, but before having known about the draft biographical notice, I commented on this section 'I have the impression that Fisher took great care in writing these paragraphs, and has given credit where credit is due'. Fisher was thereafter at pains to stress Gabon's role as the principal influence in the rise of modern statistics, notably in his foreword to Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference A possible consequence of Fisher writing for the D.N.B. was that it led him to notice that, of the famous British names he quoted, Thomas Bayes was not in the Dictionary. In 1953, when he was President of the Royal Statistical Society, he wrote to the editor of the Dictionary in an unsuccessful attempt to get the omission repaired,5 but more recently a renewed attempt by several British statisticians was successful, and the present author was asked to draft an entry which is included in the supplementary D.N 
